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Local Corruption and Global 
Capital Flows
THE RESEARCH REPORTED in this paper was inspired by a plane ride I took
from China to the United States in 1996. Browsing the newspapers and
in-ﬂight magazines, I came across one story about the high level of ofﬁcial
corruption in China, and another that extolled the extraordinarily large
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into China that year.
1 Later in the
ﬂight, I struck up a conversation with the passenger sitting next to me, an
American business executive who had just visited his joint venture firm
in China. I asked him whether the corruption problem in China affected
him and his business. He said that it did and went on to explain the myr-
iad problems that his ﬁrm had encountered in dealing with corruption and
bureaucratic red tape. 
During and after that flight, I reflected on whether corruption has gen-
erally worked as a beneficial “grease,” a minor annoyance, or a major
obstacle for international investors. In this paper I address three inter-
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1. This was at a time when China was being called “the world’s strongest magnet for
overseas investment.” P. T. Bangsberg, “China Projects Another Record Investment Year,
European, Japanese, U.S. Firms Top List,” Journal of Commerce, December 27, 1996, 
p. 3A. I found this quotation some time after the plane ride.
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does corruption distort the composition of capital inflows in a way that
might raise the likelihood of a currency crisis?
International direct investment reached $3.5 trillion in 1997. A small
number of countries in the industrial world account for the bulk—about 
68 percent—of this investment.
2 Yet international direct investment is
especially important for developing countries, for which it is not only a
source of scarce capital but also an important conduit for the transfer of
technological and managerial know-how.
3
The recent currency crises in East Asia, Russia, and Latin America have
highlighted the importance of the composition of capital flows for devel-
oping countries. Before I attempt to explain the relationship between cor-
ruption and the composition of capital inflows, it is worth noting that there
are at least two views on the causes of these crises. One increasingly wide-
spread view is that so-called crony capitalism—the misallocation of ﬁnan-
cial resources to the friends and relatives of government officials—is
partly responsible. However, there is so far virtually no systematic evi-
dence to support or reject this hypothesis.
4 The other view is that the con-
fidence of international creditors in developing economies is fragile, so
that small changes in the outlook can give rise to self-fulfilling expecta-
tions of a crisis. 
These two explanations are typically presented as rivals, but there may
be a link between them. The extent of corruption in a country may affect
that country’s composition of capital inflows in a way that makes it more
vulnerable to shifts in international creditors’expectations. Corruption
here refers to the extent to which firms or individuals need to pay bribes
to government officials to obtain permits, licenses, loans, or other gov-
ernment services needed to conduct business in a country.
5
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2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1998).
3. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1995); Eaton and Tamura (1996).
4. For surveys of the literature on corruption and economic development, see Bardhan
(1997), Kaufmann (1997), and Wei (1999). More recent papers on corruption include Wei
(2000b) and Bai and Wei (2000). None of the surveys covers any empirical study that links
crony capitalism with currency crises.
5. This paper uses the term “crony capitalism” interchangeably with “corruption.”
Although “crony capitalism” has a more limited meaning, in reality its presence almost
always implies widespread corruption, as firms and citizens in such an environment find it
necessary to pay bribes to government ofﬁcials in order to get anything done.
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inflows is correlated with the incidence of currency crises.
6 They have
found that the lower the share of FDI in total capital inﬂows, or the higher
the ratio of short-term debt to reserves, the more likely a currency crisis
becomes. One possible reason is that bank lending or other portfolio
investment may be driven more by sentiment than direct investment is.
Hence a small, unfavorable change in the recipient country’s fundamentals
may cause a large swing in portfolio capital ﬂows, from massive inﬂows to
massive outflows. This can strain the country’s currency or financial sys-
tem sufﬁciently to cause or hasten its collapse.
7To my knowledge, no stud-
ies have examined the connection between corruption (or the intrusiveness
of national bureaucracy more generally) and the composition of capital
inﬂows. This paper seeks to ﬁll that void.
A small number of previous papers have looked at the effect of corrup-
tion on FDI. Combining corruption with twelve other variables to form a
composite indicator, Ashoka Mody and David Wheeler failed to ﬁnd a sig-
nificant relation between corruption and foreign investment.
8 However,
this result may have been due to a high noise-to-signal ratio in their com-
posite indicator. Examining U.S. outward investment to individual coun-
tries, James Hines found that foreign investment is negatively related to
host-country corruption, which he interpreted as evidence of the effect of
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
9 Using a matrix of bilateral inter-
national direct investment from twelve source countries to forty-five host
countries, Wei found that FDI flows from the United States were not sta-
tistically different from those from other source countries in terms of their
degree of aversion to host-country corruption.
10 More important, corrup-
tion had not only a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient in these
analyses, but an economically large effect on inward FDI as well. For
example, in a benchmark estimation, an increase in corruption from the
level of Singapore to that of Mexico has the same negative effect on
inward FDI as raising the marginal corporate tax rate by 50 percentage
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6. The ﬁrst of these was Frankel and Rose (1996), followed by Radelet and Sachs (1998)
and Rodrik and Velasco (1999).
7. Radelet and Sachs (1998); Rodrik and Velasco (1999); Reisen (1999).
8. Mody and Wheeler (1992). 
9. Hines (1995). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 makes it illegal for U.S.-
headquartered ﬁrms to pay bribes to foreign ofﬁcials.
10. Wei (2000a).
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found that host-country corruption induces foreign investors to favor joint
ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries.
11
Many host countries have a variety of restrictions on the ability of for-
eign ﬁrms to operate in their territory. For example, foreign investors may
be forbidden from entering certain sectors, from exercising full control
over their foreign affiliates, or from freely engaging in foreign exchange
transactions that allow them to import intermediate inputs or repatriate
profits. Of course, many countries also have policies designed specifi-
cally to attract foreign investment. These can range from tax concessions
and subsidized loans to special incentives for export-related foreign invest-
ment. Notably absent from existing studies are empirical measures of
either these restrictions or these incentives in the relevant regressions. As
far as I know, a cross-country data set on these restrictions and incentives
has not existed before now. Yet their omission could be significant. For
example, if corruption and restrictions on FDI are positively correlated
(that is, if corrupt countries are also more likely to impose restrictions on
foreign investment), the ﬁndings of previous studies could exaggerate the
effect of corruption on inward FDI.
There are reasons to think that corruption and restrictions on FDI might
indeed be positively correlated. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny pro-
vided a conceptual framework in which bureaucratic interference (such
as license requirements) is endogenously determined to extract bribes.
12 In
such a setting, red tape and bribes could be positively correlated. Using
data from firm-level surveys, Daniel Kaufmann and Wei indeed found
evidence that firms that pay more bribes also face more, not less, bureau-
cratic intrusion in equilibrium.
13 This could come about because both the
level of corruption and the level of red tape are endogenously determined
in response to characteristics of the sector or the firm in question. On the
flip side, if host governments systematically offer incentives to foreign
investors in an effort to compensate for corruption problems in their coun-
try, previous estimates of the effect of the corruption that do not adequately
control for these incentives could be biased downward. Together these
considerations suggest that the omission of host governments’policies
306 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
11. Smarzynska and Wei (2000).
12. Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
13. Kaufmann and Wei (1999).
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ruption on FDI.
As a first contribution to this literature, this paper presents data on a
new cross-country measure of restrictions and incentives on inward FDI.
Scoring on this measure is based on my reading of detailed descriptions
in a series of investment guides for individual countries produced by a
worldwide consulting and accounting ﬁrm.
14 The paper then embeds these
two new variables in an empirical reexamination of the effect of corruption
on foreign investment. 
The paper’s second contribution is an examination of the effect of cor-
ruption on the composition of capital inﬂows (FDI versus borrowing from
foreign banks, in particular). This is done by effectively comparing possi-
bly different effects of corruption on different forms of capital flows. I
am not aware of any previous study that has looked at this issue from an
empirical standpoint.
It is important to note how “corruption” is interpreted in the paper.
Bureaucratic corruption, excessive red tape, corruption in the judicial sys-
tem, and absence of the rule of law are all different dimensions of poor
public governance, but because they tend to be highly correlated, it is dif-
ficult to isolate their separate effects. Consequently, “corruption” in the
paper should be interpreted more broadly as “poor public governance”
rather than as bureaucratic corruption narrowly deﬁned.
Corruption and the Volume of Foreign Direct Investment
I begin by investigating the effect of bureaucratic corruption on the
volume of inward FDI, paying special attention to measuring and con-
trolling for the effect of government policies toward this investment.
Measuring Corruption and Government Restrictions on FDI and
Incentives for FDI
The key variables in the regressions that follow are measures of the
volume of bilateral international direct investment, the composition of
capital flows, corruption, and governments’policies toward FDI. These
Shang-Jin Wei 307
14. The series is the Doing Business and Investing series published by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (2000).
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appendix A.
VOLUME OF INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT. The analysis
attempts to explain two aspects of international capital flows. The first is
the volume of bilateral direct investment. For this purpose I use end-of-
year stock data for fourteen source countries and fifty-three host coun-
tries from table 8 of the International Direct Investment database of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
15To reduce the
influence of year-to-year fluctuations, I use the average over 1994–96 as
the left-hand-side variable.
COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL FLOWS. To examine the composition of cap-
ital inﬂows, I calculate the ratio of foreign bank borrowing to FDI for each
source country–host country pair. Bilateral bank lending data (end-of-year
outstanding loans) from thirteen lending countries to eighty-three bor-
rowing countries were obtained from the Bank for International Settle-
ments’Consolidated International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks on Indi-
vidual Countries. Exclusion of missing observations leaves 793 country
pairs. As with bilateral FDI, the data are averaged over 1994–96.
It is preferable to examine the composition of bilateral rather than
aggregate capital flows because some of the determinants of these flows
are bilateral in nature, such as linguistic and historic ties between the
source and the recipient country. Using aggregate data from the balance
of payments is likely to introduce more noise. On the other hand, as far
as I know, no data on international portfolio flows are available for a
matrix of country pairs (with the exception of the United States, for which
bilateral outward portfolio investment data are available). 
CORRUPTION. Because corruption is illegal and therefore conducted
clandestinely, it is inherently difficult to quantify. Three types of mea-
sures of corruption are available, all of which are perception-based, sub-
jective indexes. The ﬁrst type consists of ratings given by in-house experts
at international consulting ﬁrms. Representative indexes are those of Busi-
ness International (now part of The Economist’s Economic Intelligence
Unit) and Political Risk Services Group, which publishes the International
Country Risk Guide (and whose ratings are accordingly called ICRG rat-
ings). The second type is based on surveys of business executives or other
people in the countries in question. The rating for a country is typically the
average of the respondents’ratings. Examples of this include indexes in
308 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
15. OECD (2000).
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Development Report (WDR)—and an index, first used by Alberto Ades
and Rafael Di Tella, derived from interviews with German exporters. All
are decribed in more detail below. The third type of corruption measure is
based on an average of existing indexes. The best known example is the
index produced by Transparency International, a German-based non-
governmental organization devoted to fighting corruption. A drawback of
this type of index is that mixing indexes with different country coverage
and methodologies can introduce noise into the measure.
In general, corruption ratings based on surveys of firms are preferable
to those based on the intuition of in-house experts, for two reasons. First,
the executives who respond to surveys like the GCR and WDR surveys
presumably have more direct experience with corruption than do the in-
house consultants, each of whom typically has to rate many countries. Sec-
ond, to the extent that the judgments of individual respondents contain
idiosyncratic errors, the averaging process in the GCR and WDR indexes
can minimize the influence of such errors. This paper uses the indexes
from the GCR and WDR surveys as its basic measure of corruption. 
The GCR corruption index is derived from Global Competitiveness
Report 1997, produced jointly by the Geneva-based World Economic
Forum and the Harvard Institute for International Development.
16 The
GCR survey was conducted in late 1996 on 2,827 ﬁrms in ﬁfty-three coun-
tries. Question 8.03 of the survey asked respondents to rate, on a scale of
one to seven, the level of corruption in the country where they were doing
business. The level of corruption was defined as the extent to which
respondents observed “irregular, additional payments connected with
imports and exports permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessments, police protection or loan applications.” The index for a given
country was calculated as the average of individual respondents’ratings.
The WDR corruption index is derived from a World Bank survey, con-
ducted in 1996 and early 1997, of 3,685 firms in sixty-nine countries in
preparation for its World Development Report 1997.
17 Question 14 of that
survey asked, “Is it common for ﬁrms in my line of business to have to pay
some irregular, ‘additional’payments to get things done?” The respondents
were asked to rate the level of corruption, thus deﬁned, on a scale of one to
six. The index was then calculated as the country average of the respon-
Shang-Jin Wei 309
16. World Economic Forum and Harvard Institute for International Development (1997).
17. World Bank (1997).
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scaled such that a higher number implies less corruption. To avoid awk-
wardness in interpretation, they are rescaled in this paper so that a higher
number implies more corruption.
The country coverage of the GCR and WDR indexes differs, and each
covers only a subset of the countries for which data are available on FDI or
other forms of capital ﬂows. This makes it desirable to combine the GCR
and WDR indexes into a composite corruption index. Fortunately, the two
indexes are derived from surveys with similar methodologies and similar
questions—the correlation between the two, for the countries they cover in
common, is 0.83. The composite index is constructed following a simple
three-step procedure. First, the GCR index is taken as the benchmark.
Next, the ratio of the GCR to the WDR index is computed for all coun-
tries that are covered in both surveys. Finally, for those relatively few
countries covered by the WDR survey but not by the GCR survey, the
WDR rating is converted to the GCR scale using the ratio calculated in
the second step.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD FDI. This paper’s quantification of
government policies toward FDI relies on detailed descriptions compiled
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) in its series of country reports, which
are written for multinational ﬁrms intending to do business in a particular
country. The whole series is also available on a single CD-ROM.
18 Each
country report covers a variety of legal and regulatory issues of interest to
foreign investors, including restrictions on foreign investment and
investors (typically chapter 5), investment incentives (typically chap-
ter 4), and taxation of foreign corporations (typically chapter 16).
For purposes of the present analysis it was necessary to convert the
textual information in the PwC reports into numerical codes. For the mea-
sure of restrictions on FDI, a variable was created based on the presence or
absence of restrictions in the following four areas:
—controls on foreign exchange transactions (on the grounds that such
controls may interfere with foreign firms’ability to import intermediate
inputs or repatriate proﬁts);
—exclusion of foreign firms from certain strategic sectors (in particu-
lar, national defense and the mass media);
310 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
18. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000).
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would be considered harmless in most developed countries; and
—restrictions on the share of foreign ownership (for example, wholly
foreign-owned firms may not be allowed, or foreign ownership in a joint
venture may not exceed 50 percent). 
Each of these four dimensions can be represented by a variable that
takes the value of one in the presence of the restriction and zero in its
absence. The overall “FDI restrictions” variable is then set equal to the
sum of these four variables. Hence the overall variable is zero if there is no
restriction in any of the four categories, and four if there are restrictions
in each category.
Similarly, an “FDI incentives” index was created using information in
the following areas:
—the existence of special incentives for foreigners to invest in certain
industries or certain geographic areas;
—tax concessions speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms (including tax holidays and
tax rebates, but excluding tax concessions speciﬁcally designed for export
promotion);
—cash grants, subsidized loans, reduced rent for land use, or other non-
tax concessions, when these are speciﬁc to foreign ﬁrms; and
—special promotion for exports (including the existence of export pro-
cessing zones, special economic zones, and the like).
The overall “FDI incentives” variable was created as the sum of these
four variables.
Table 1 reports the values of the FDI restrictions and incentives vari-
ables by country. Table 2 provides summary statistics on all the key vari-
ables and table 3 their pairwise correlations. We define “net incentives”
as the difference between the overall incentives variable and the overall
restrictions variable. According to this measure, the countries least hos-
pitable to FDI (those for which the value of the net incentives variable is
–2 or smaller) are India, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Taiwan, and
Ukraine. Those countries that try the most to attract FDI (that is, those
whose net incentive ratings are greater than or equal to 2) are Argentina,
Israel, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
This coding of the incentives and restrictions measures is still coarse
and may not capture the true variations in government policies. Nonethe-
less, it is important to have a way to control for these government poli-
cies in statistical analyses of international capital flows. The contribution
Shang-Jin Wei 311







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9760-09  BPEA Wei  12/21/2000 14:20  Page 313of this paper is to create the ﬁrst-of-its-kind index of FDI restrictions and
incentives. I will let the empirical results obtained with these data speak
to their usefulness.
Baseline Regressions
We ﬁrst examine the effect of local corruption on the volume of inward
FDI. The specification can be motivated by a simple optimization problem
facing a multinational firm. Let K(j) be the stock of investment that the
314 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Corruption Measures and Other Key Variables
No. of Standard
Variable observations Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
GCR/WDR corruption  99 3.62 1.19 1.3 5.5
index
Transparency International  85 5.12 2.40 0 8.6
corruption index
German exporters’ 103 4.58 3.11 0 10
corruption index
Corporate tax rate  56 32.39 6.86 0 42
(percent)
FDI incentives 49 1.65 0.69 0 3
FDI restrictions 49 1.69 1.18 0 4
GDP per capitaa 154 5,792 9,222 104 43,602
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Average over 1994–96 in 1995 dollars.
Table 3. Correlations of the Corruption Measures and Other Key Variables
Corruption index
Transparency German Corporate FDI  FDI 
Variable GCR/WDR International exporters’ tax rate incentives restrictions
Transparency 0.82 1.00
International
German exporters’ 0.76 0.84 1.00
Corporate tax rate 0.08 0.16 –0.07 1.00
FDI incentives 0.27 0.31 0.41 0.22 1.00
FDI restrictions 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.09 0.28 1.00
GDP per capitaa –0.71 –0.83 –0.66 –0.16 –0.48 –0.42
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Average over 1994–96 in 1995 dollars.
9760-09  BPEA Wei  12/21/2000 14:20  Page 314ﬁrm will choose to allocate to host country j. Let t(j) be the rate of corpo-
rate income tax in that country, b(j) be the rate of bribery the firm has to
pay per unit of output, and r be the rental rate of capital. Let f[K(j)] be
the output of the ﬁrm in host country j. The ﬁrm can invest in any of N pos-
sible host countries. It chooses the level of K(j) for j = 1, 2, …, N, in a
manner that maximizes its total after-tax and after-bribery proﬁt: 
As a simple way to indicate that taxes and corruption are distortionary, in
this equation the factor [1 – t(j) – b(j)] premultiplies output rather than
profit. The optimal stock of FDI in country j, K(j), would of course be
related to both the rate of tax and that of corruption in the host country: K =
K[t(j), b(j)], where ∂K/∂t < 0 and ∂K/∂b < 0.
19
Let FDI(k, j) be the bilateral stock of foreign direct investment by
source country k in host country j. The empirical analysis starts with the
following baseline speciﬁcation:
where D(i) is a source-country dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the source country is i (that is, if k = i), and zero otherwise; X(j) is
a vector of characteristics of host country j other than its tax and corruption
levels;  Z(k,  j) is a vector of characteristics specific to the source 
country–host country pair; e(k, j) is an independently and identically dis-
tributed error that follows a normal distribution; and  (i),  1,  2,  , and  
are parameters to be estimated.
This is a quasi-ﬁxed-effects regression in that source-country dummies
are included. These dummies are meant to capture all characteristics of the
source countries, including their size and level of development, that may
affect the amount of their outward FDI. In addition, the ﬁxed-effects spec-
iﬁcation controls for possible differences in the source countries’deﬁnition
of FDI. This assumes that the FDI values for a particular country pair
under these definitions are proportional to each other, except for an addi-
() (,) ( ) ( ) () ()
() ,) (,) ,
2 12 FDI k j i D i tax j corruption j
jk j e k j
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19. A more sophisticated generalization, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would
include endogenizing the levels of corruption and of taxation as done by Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) or Kaufmann and Wei (1999).
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does not impose host-country ﬁxed effects, because doing so would elim-
inate the possibility of estimating all the interesting parameters, including
the effect of corruption. 
Table 4 reports a series of regressions using this basic specification
and the progressive addition of control variables. In regression equation
4-1, where the corruption and tax variables are included but government
policies toward FDI are not, both variables have negative and statistically
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients.
Governments’restrictions on and incentives for foreign investment are
added to regression equation 4-2. The incentives and the restrictions have
a positive and a negative coefﬁcient, respectively, consistent with intuition.
Both are statistically significant. In this regression that controls for gov-
ernment policies toward FDI, the effect of corruption declines a bit yet
remains statistically significant. Furthermore, the negative effect of cor-
ruption is quantitatively significant as well. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the tax rate (by 6.86 percentage points according to table 2)
would reduce inward FDI by 19.7 percent.
20 In contrast, a one-standard-
deviation increase in corruption (by 1.19 index points) would reduce
inward FDI by 28.3 percent,
21 a far greater magnitude. To make the point
another way, a rise in the host country’s corruption from that prevailing
in Singapore to that prevailing in Russia (that is, a rise in corruption by
5.3 – 1.6 = 3.7 on the GCR/WDR scale) would reduce FDI by 65 percent.
That is equivalent to raising the marginal corporate tax rate by 32 per-
centage points.
22
Regression equation 4-3 adds exchange rate volatility and the average
government deficit as regressors. A country with a larger government
deficit tends to receive less inward FDI. The coefficient on exchange rate
volatility is not significant. When these variables are controlled for, the
effect of corruption on the volume of FDI remains negative and statisti-
cally significant. Exchange rate volatility can be thought of as indicating
the stability of a country’s monetary policy. As another such measure, the
316 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
20. Exp(–0.032   6.86) – 1 = –0.197.
21. Exp(–0.280   1.19) – 1 = –0.283.
22. The percentage reduction in FDI associated with the rise in corruption is exp(–0.28
× 3.7) –1 = –0.645. The tax equivalent of the rise in corruption is (–0.28   3.7)/–0.032
= 32.4.




variable 4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4 4-5 4-6
Corruption
b –0.337** –0.280** –0.205** –0.217** –0.152** –0.149*
(0.068) (0.070) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.081)
Corporate tax  –0.028** –0.032** –0.003 –0.003 0.019 0.002
rate (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
FDI incentives 0.410** 0.275** 0.273** 0.410** 0.185*
(0.093) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.110)
FDI restrictions –0.337** –0.294** –0.294** –0.314** –0.304**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.058)
Log GDP
c 0.864** 0.862** 1.040** 1.039** 0.976** 0.998**
(0.049) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057)
Log GDP per  –0.038 –0.019 0.026 0.005 –0.071 –0.005
capita
c (0.078) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.095) (0.083)
Log distance
d –0.577** –0.553** –0.656** –0.660** –0.741** –0.685**
(0.062) (0.061) (0.067) (0.066) (0.073) (0.066)
Presence of  1.516** 1.437** 1.232** 1.216** 0.956** 1.189**
linguistic tie
e (0.216) (0.210) (0.214) (0.214) (0.221) (0.211)
Exchange 2.388 2.736 7.036** 6.654**
rate volatility
f (2.110) (2.118) (2.214) (2.253)
Government –0.096** –0.096** –0.110** –0.107**
deﬁcit
c,g (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)











2 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.76
No. observations 658 628 580 580 467 565
a. The equations are fixed-effects regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of annual bilateral flows of
FDI between source and host countries (averaged over 1994–96). All regressions include source-country dummy variables
whose coefficients are not reported. See appendix A for a full description of the other variables. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
b. As measured by the GCR/WDR index.
c. Average over 1994–96.
d. Distance in kilometers between designated economic centers in the two countries.
e. Between source and host country.
f. Standard deviation of the monthly-average exchange rate, in logarithms, from 1994 through 1996.
g. As a percentage of GDP.
h. Product of corruption and a dummy variable that equals one when the United States is the source country.
i. Index taken from La Porta and others (1998).
j. Index taken from Wei (1997).
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was not signiﬁcant by itself.
Until recently, the United States was the only major FDI source country
in the world that made it a crime for its multinational companies to pay
bribes to foreign government officials.
23 Offending firms face monetary
ﬁnes, and corporate ofﬁcers may face jail terms in addition. This suggests
the possibility that American firms have been systematically more averse
to investing in corrupt countries than firms from other countries. On the
other hand, there are also reasons to think that U.S. investors may not be
that different. First, American firms may have used their entrepreneurial
skills to find covert substitutes for outright cash bribery, for example by
sponsoring all-expense-paid travel for foreign government officials. Sec-
ond, corruption and other dimensions of poor public governance tend to be
correlated. Multinational ﬁrms from other source countries may be just as
averse as U.S. firms to investing in poorly governed countries, which are
also likely to be highly corrupt. To sum up, whether U.S. firms are sys-
tematically more averse to host-country corruption than other investors is
theoretically ambiguous.
To investigate this effect empirically, a term interacting the U.S. source-
country dummy and the level of host-country corruption was included as
an additional regressor in regression equation 4-4 (the U.S. source dummy
by itself has already been included). If American investors are more averse
to corruption, the coefficient on the interactive term will be negative. In
fact, the point estimate on the new interactive term is –0.12. However, the
relatively large standard error on the coefficient implies that the null
hypothesis of a zero coefﬁcient cannot be rejected.
Regression equation 4-5 reports results from adding as another regres-
sor a measure of the quality of a country’s accounting standards. This
was done to examine the possibility that poor accounting standards in a
host country may deter FDI. Good accounting standards are indeed asso-
ciated with more inward FDI. The estimated effect of corruption on FDI
becomes smaller but remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
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23. Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (see above). Bribery of foreign ofﬁ-
cials was not a crime for ﬁrms from other major source countries until the OECD Conven-
tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions
took effect on February 15, 1999.
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tion” of the corruption market matters: is corruption centrally organized
and predictable, or is it disorganized and unpredictable?
24 From individ-
ual responses to survey questions on corruption, I previously developed an
index of corruption-related arbitrariness.
25 It is a three-step process. First,
all individual corruption responses are regressed on a set of industry dum-
mies and dummies for ﬁrm size, to remove the inﬂuence of industrial and
firm characteristics on the corruption experience of the respondents. Sec-
ond, for each country, extreme values (roughly 5 percent of all responses
for a given country) are removed in a manner analogous to the scoring in
Olympics gymnastics competition. Finally, the standard deviation of the
remaining answers for a given country is taken as a measure of that coun-
try’s corruption-related arbitrariness. This measure is then used as an addi-
tional regressor. The idea is that the more arbitrary corruption is, the
greater the dispersion in individual firms’experience with corrupt officials
should be. This arbitrariness index has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant effect on inward FDI in regressions that omit the government deficit
variable (not reported), but it loses statistical significance once the gov-
ernment deﬁcit is controlled for (regression equation 4-6).
Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks were performed employing different speci-
fications, a different way of coding the corruption measure, alternative
measures of corruption from different sources, and more control variables.
Table C1 in appendix C reports a series of regressions in which host-
country random effects were added to the equation (while still maintaining
source-country fixed effects). This was done to control for the possibility
that FDI from different source countries to a common host country may be
correlated because of a common missing variable. The results are broadly
consistent with those in the previous tables. In particular, FDI incentives
always have a positive effect on FDI, and both corruption and FDI restric-
tions are negatively associated with inward FDI. Most important for this
paper, the coefﬁcient on corruption is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in all cases.
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25. Wei (1997).
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index ranging from zero to six, may impose too much linearity in the effect
of corruption on FDI. To see whether the result is sensitive to this fine
gradation, I also experimented with a coarse partition of the host coun-
tries into high-corruption and low-corruption countries, according to
whether their corruption index is above or below the median. The results,
reported in regression equations C2-1 and C2-2 of appendix table C2, are
qualitatively similar to those reported above. The coefficient for the cor-
ruption variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Since the GCR/WDR measure of corruption is a subjective index, it may
be useful to see whether the results continue to hold if one employs alter-
native measures of corruption from different sources. For this purpose I use
the corruption index produced by Transparency International and that
derived from interviews with German exporters and used by Ades and Di
Tella.
26 The results, reported in regression equations C2-3 through C2-6 of
appendix table C2, again are qualitatively similar to those presented above:
corruption in a host country substantially reduces the volume of inward
FDI. Since the original GCR and WDR surveys covered different sets of
countries, and potentially different sets of firms even in the countries that
appear in both surveys, I also performed regressions with each of these
two corruption measures alone. The results (not reported) are essentially the
same as when the two corruption ratings are merged.
In all of the previous regressions, the left-hand-side variable is the log-
arithm of bilateral FDI. Since the logarithm of zero is not deﬁned, all coun-
try pairs that have zero FDI were dropped from the regressions. Doing so
may, however, bias the estimates. To see whether this data censorship is
driving the results, I experimented with a version of the tobit regression
in which the left-hand-side variable is deﬁned as ln(FDI + 0.1). Regression
equation C2-7 in appendix table C2 reports the results. This adjustment
in the speciﬁcation allows a modest increase in the number of observations
(from 580 in equation 4-3 in table 4 to 621 in equation C2-7). Although the
magnitude of the point estimates changes a bit, the qualitative inference
remains the same.
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26. Ades and Di Tella (1997).
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China is an apparent puzzle. In the 1990s China was often the single
largest developing-country host of FDI, according to official balance of
payments data reported by China. When one regresses the logarithm of
FDI on GDP, GDP per capita, and a dummy for China as a host country,
the coefﬁcient on the China dummy is found (in results not reported here)
to be positive and significant. In other words, China appears to attract
significantly more FDI than its size or level of development suggest that
it should. It is these impressive amounts of inward FDI that have led some
observers to call China “the world’s strongest magnet for overseas invest-
ment” or to call the inflows a case of “China fever.”
27Yet China is also
reported to be very corrupt. Does corruption in China reduce inward FDI
or not?
This appears to contradict the central message of the previous section.
Taking this puzzle head on, I will argue that the correct way to ascertain
whether China hosts an unusually large amount of FDI is to ﬁrst establish
a benchmark model that can estimate how much FDI China should have
received given its economic characteristics, policies, and other factors. The
empirical model in the previous section provides just such a benchmark.
Then one can compare what China actually has received with what the
model says it should have received. 
To begin with the bottom line, the empirical results indicate that, as far
as FDI from the world’s major source countries is concerned, there is noth-
ing to support the notion that China is a supermagnet for inward FDI.
28
Thus, corruption is just as damaging to FDI into China as it is elsewhere.
Indeed, some weak evidence suggests that China may even be an under-
achiever as a host of FDI.
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27. P. T. Bangsberg, Journal of Commerce, December 27, 1996, p. 3A; The Economist
(U.S. edition), March 1, 1997 p. 38. 
28. Using FDI data for 1993, Wei (2000c) found that China was actually a substantial
underachiever as a host of FDI. But it was only later that labels like “China fever” and “the
world’s strongest magnet” emerged, making a reexamination necessary. In addition, this
paper now provides a comprehensive index on government policies toward FDI, which
was not available before.
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The source composition of Chinese FDI is quite unusual. According to
the OECD, the ﬁve most important source countries in terms of worldwide
FDI outflow during 1990–95 were (in order of importance) the United
States, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.
29 Collectively,
these five countries accounted for over 70 percent of direct investment
worldwide. The dominant source of FDI into China, however, is Hong
Kong (table 5). Annual FDI inﬂows from Hong Kong accounted for half or
more of all FDI into China in almost every single year during 1992–97,
and this dominance tends to be even greater in the earlier years of the
period. Similarly, Hong Kong’s share of the stock of Chinese FDI is close
to 60 percent. Taiwan, Japan, and the United States are the second-, third-,
and fourth-largest investors in China (their relative ranking varies from
year to year). However, each typically brings in less than a quarter of
what Hong Kong invests. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany are
also important source countries, but their investments not only lag far
behind that of Hong Kong but sometimes are less than those of Singapore
and Macao.
Part of the reported FDI from Hong Kong is in fact capital that origi-
nated in mainland China and is returning to the mainland disguised as
Hong Kong investment. This “round-tripping” is done to take advantage of
tax, tariff, and other benefits accorded to foreign investment in China. One
estimate puts such “false-foreign” capital at 15 percent of all of Hong
Kong’s direct investment in China.
30 That would imply that such invest-
ment was on the order of $3 billion in 1997, or over 6 percent of the total
FDI ﬂow into China that year, according to ofﬁcial statistics.
China as a Host of Direct Investment from the 
Major Source Countries
The first four columns in table 6 report a series of regressions that add a
dummy for China as a host country. If China has truly attracted more FDI
than expected for a country with its characteristics, the coefﬁcient on this
dummy should be positive and statistically significant. In fact, however,
322 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
29. OECD (2000).
30. Huang (1998).
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the coefficient on the China dummy is invariably negative and usually
statistically significant. In other words, relative to the empirical bench-
mark, China is an underachiever as a host of FDI, not a superstar.
A possible concern is that the empirical model may penalize more pop-
ulous countries like China. Therefore regression equation 6-4 reports a
regression in which the square of the logarithm of population is included
as a regressor. The previous regressions implicitly controlled for the loga-
rithm of population, because ln(population) is the difference between
ln(GDP) and ln(GDP per capita). The coefficient on this new regressor
turns out not to be different statistically from zero. In any case, the coefﬁ-
cient on the China dummy remains negative.
To conclude, there is absolutely no support for the hypothesis that
China is a superachiever as a host of FDI from the world’s major source
countries. To the contrary, to the extent there is a puzzle about FDI into
China, it is why China appears to be an underachiever in this regard.
The Hong Kong Connection
It is often remarked that Hong Kong is a mecca for FDI. It seems pos-
sible that, in part because investors from other source countries loathe the
corruption and red tape they encounter on the mainland, they invest heav-
ily in Hong Kong as a stepping-stone to or substitute for investing in
mainland China. Indeed, some of Hong Kong’s observed investment in
China may have been made on behalf of investors from the major source
countries.
To see whether the Hong Kong connection helps solve the puzzle of
China’s underachievement, half of the observed FDI into Hong Kong from
the major source countries was reclassified as additional FDI into China
from the same source countries.
31 This is likely an overadjustment, since
a substantial part of FDI into Hong Kong is truly destined for Hong Kong.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to see whether such a draconian adjustment
could turn the China dummy from a signiﬁcant negative to zero. 
The results, reported in the last three equations in table 6, show that this
is indeed the case. This experiment has a high degree of arbitrariness, how-
ever. It only serves to demonstrate that the gap between actual FDI into
31. Because data on FDI from Hong Kong to countries other than China are unavail-
able, FDI from Hong Kong are not part of the data in the regressions.
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China and the potential amount as defined by these regressions is enor-
mous. China may be a uniquely lucky host country (compared with, say,
India or Russia) in that Hong Kong may have helped it attract FDI from the
major source countries that it would not have received otherwise.
Corruption and the Composition of Capital Inﬂows
The composition of capital inflows has important implications: for
example, it may affect the likelihood that a country will suffer a currency
crisis. To motivate the analysis of capital ﬂow composition that follows, I
begin by looking at differences in the volatility of various types of capital
flow. I compute the standard deviations of three types of inflow—portfolio
capital, bank borrowing, and FDI, all measured as percentages of recipi-
ent-country GDP—during 1980–96 for every member country of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund for which data on all three variables are available.
Table 7 shows that, for the subset of OECD countries (twenty countries
that were OECD members as of 1980), the volatility of the FDI-to-GDP
ratio is substantially smaller than that of the other two ratios. For the non-
OECD countries as a group, the FDI-to-GDP ratio is also much less
volatile than the loans-to-GDP ratio, but more volatile than the portfolio
ﬂow–to–GDP ratio. The table also reports the volatility of the three ratios
for a number of individual countries that have featured prominently in the
recent currency crises. For each country, the loans-to-GDP ratio is at least
twice and as much as fifteen times as volatile as the FDI-to-GDP ratio;
the portfolio capital–to–GDP ratio is likewise more volatile than the FDI-
to-GDP ratio. When the sample period is extended to include 1997 and
1998, the differences in volatility are even more pronounced (results not
reported). Therefore the data are consistent with the hypothesis that FDI
is less sentiment-driven and hence more stable as a source of foreign
capital.
This section studies the connection between the degree of corruption
in capital-receiving countries and the composition of capital flows into
these countries. In particular, I focus on the size of bilateral direct invest-
ment versus that of bilateral bank lending from thirteen developed coun-
tries to thirty developing and transition economies. (Except for that origi-
nating from the United States, it was not possible to obtain data on
nonbank portfolio investment on a bilateral basis.) 
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Corruption is bad for both international direct investors and interna-
tional creditors. Corrupt borrowing countries are more likely to default
on bank loans and to nationalize (or otherwise diminish the value of) the
assets of foreign direct investors. When this happens, there is a limit to
how much international arbitration or court proceedings can help to
recover the assets, because there is a limit to how much collateral the for-
eign creditors or direct investors can seize as compensation. 
One may argue that domestic investors have an informational advantage
over international investors: the former are more likely to have detailed
ﬁrsthand experience of local markets and business practices. Among inter-
national investors, direct investors may have an informational advantage
over portfolio investors (and, presumably, over banks engaged in interna-
tional lending). International direct investors can, for example, obtain
information about the local market by stationing managers from head-
quarters in the host country. These cross-border informational asymme-
Table 7. Standard Deviations of Ratios of FDI, Bank Lending, and Portfolio Flows to
GDP, 1980–96a
FDI–GDP  Bank lending– Portfolio ﬂows–
Item ratio GDP ratio GDP ratio
OECD (20 countries)
Mean 0.007 0.021 0.020
Median 0.006 0.017 0.019
Non-OECD (73 countries)
Mean 0.022 0.044 0.011
Median 0.010 0.035 0.004
Whole sample (93 countries)
Mean 0.019 0.039 0.013
Median 0.009 0.033 0.009
Selected countries
Indonesia 0.007 0.017 0.009
Korea, Rep. of 0.002 0.037 0.014
Malaysia 0.023 0.034 0.023
Mexico 0.007 0.033 0.026
Philippines 0.009 0.026 0.017
Thailand 0.007 0.028 0.012
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, various
issues, and the World Bank’s Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators databases.
a. The sample includes those countries for which data for all three variables are available in at least eight years from 1980 to
1996.
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tries may lead to a bias in favor of international direct investment. Indeed,
this is the logic underlying one recent theory of the “pecking order of inter-
national capital flows.”
32 Corruption, however, could temper this effect.
The need for international investors to pay bribes and deal with official
extortion tends to increase with the frequency and the extent of their inter-
actions with local bureaucrats. Given that international direct investors
are more likely to have repeated interactions with local officials (for per-
mits, taxes, health inspections, and so forth) than international banks or
portfolio investors, one would expect local corruption to be more detri-
mental to FDI than to other forms of capital flows. Along the same line,
direct investment involves greater sunk costs than do bank loans or port-
folio investment. Once an investment is made, corrupt local officials,
knowing that the investment cannot easily be liquidated, may threaten to
raise obstacles to that investment’s success unless they are paid a bribe.
Hence, direct investors would ﬁnd themselves in a weaker bargaining posi-
tion than international banks or portfolio investors. This ex post disad-
vantage of FDI would tend to make international direct investors more
cautious ex ante in a corrupt host country than international portfolio
investors.
33
There is a second reason why local corruption might deter interna-
tional direct investment more than it does international bank credit or port-
folio investment. Under the current international financial architecture,
international creditors are more likely than international direct investors to
be bailed out in time of crisis. For example, during the 1994–95 tequila
crisis and the more recent Asian currency crises, the International Mone-
tary Fund, the World Bank, and the Group of Seven countries mobilized a
large amount of funds for the affected countries, to prevent or minimize
potentially massive defaults on bank loans. An international bailout of
bank loans in the event of a severe crisis has by now been embedded ﬁrmly
in market expectations. (In addition, many developing-country govern-
ments implicitly or explicitly guarantee loans to the country’s private
32. Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998).
33. Tornell (1990) presented a model in which a combination of sunk cost in real invest-
ment and uncertainty leads to underinvestment in real projects even when the inflow of
ﬁnancial capital is abundant.
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sector.)
34 There have been no comparable examples of international assis-
tance packages for the recovery of nationalized or extorted assets of for-
eign direct investors, except for an insignificant amount of insurance,
which is often expensive to acquire. This difference makes banks more
willing than direct investors to do business with corrupt countries, further
distorting the composition of capital ﬂows.
Both reasons suggest that corruption may affect the composition of cap-
ital inflows in a way that makes the host country more likely to experi-
ence a currency crisis. Of course, the composition of capital ﬂows affects
economic development in ways that go beyond its effect on the propen-
sity for a currency crisis. Indeed, many would argue that attracting FDI,
as opposed to international bank loans or portfolio investment, is a more
useful way to transfer technology and managerial know-how.
To take some concrete examples, table 8 shows the total amounts of
inward FDI, foreign bank loans, and portfolio capital inflows, as well as
the ratios of the last two to FDI, for four countries: Singapore, New
Zealand, Argentina, and Thailand. Singapore and New Zealand both have
relatively low corruption and relatively low ratios of loans to FDI and port-
folio investment to FDI. In contrast, Argentina and Thailand have rela-
tively high corruption and relatively high ratios of loans to FDI and of
portfolio capital to FDI. These examples are consistent with the notion that
local corruption is correlated with the pattern of capital inﬂows. Of course,
these four countries are just examples. Two questions need to be addressed
more formally. First, can the association between corruption and the com-
position of capital ﬂows be generalized beyond these four countries? Sec-
ond, once we control for a number of other characteristics that affect the
composition of capital inflows, is the positive association between cor-
ruption and the ratio of loans to FDI still in evidence?
A Minimalist Model
In the discussion of the empirical analyses below, I will link the ratio
of bank borrowing to inward FDI with corruption. Here a simple two-
34. McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1999) argue that such government guarantees generate
moral hazard, which in turn leads developing countries to overborrow in international
credit markets.
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period model is used to demonstrate how this specification may be justi-
ﬁed. For simplicity, let us assume that there are two types of international
capital flows: direct investment and bank credit. Let us suppose that the
government in capital-importing country k maximizes the following two-
period objective function:
where G(k,1) and G(k,2) are government expenditures in country k in the
ﬁrst and second periods, respectively, and   is the subjective discount fac-
tor. For simplicity, we assume that tax revenues in the two periods, T(k,1)
and T(k,2), are given exogenously. Let B(k) and D(k) be first-period bor-
rowing by country k from international banks and ﬁrst-period direct invest-
ment in country k, respectively. To abstract from unnecessary complica-
tions, I assume that bank credit and FDI are merely two forms of
additional funding sources. No production is explicitly modeled. In this
case the gap between first-period expenditure and tax revenue has to be
met by an inﬂow of international capital:
In the second period, the international credit has to be repaid, and inter-
national direct investors are assumed to recoup both the investment and the
gross proﬁt on that investment:
() (,) (,) – [() ]() – [ () ] () , 52 2 Gk Tk RBk Bk RDk Dk =
() (,) (,) () () . 41 1 Gk Tk Bk Dk =+ +
( ) [ ( , )] [ ( , )], 31 2 UGk UGk +δ
Table 8. Corruption and the Composition of Capital Flows in Selected Countries
Item Singapore New Zealand Argentina Thailand
Corruptiona 1.6 1.8 4.5 5.5
Capital ﬂows 
(millions of dollars)
Bank lending 3,250 284 4,840 777
Portfolio ﬂows 677 193 8,380 237
FDI 7,380 263 4,730 134
Ratios to FDIb
Bank lending 0.44 0.11 1.02 5.79
Portfolio ﬂows 0.09 0.07 1.77 1.76
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, various issues. 
a. As measured by the GCR index.
b. Averages over 1994–96.
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where R[B(k)] and R[D(k)] are the gross returns that international creditors
and international direct investors demand from country k. Suppose R* is
the gross return on a risk-free bond. Then, assume that
and
Both   and  (k) are positive parameters.  (k) should be thought of as
proportional to country k’s perceived level of corruption. The positive
value for   reflects the assumption that the warranted return on either bank
credit or direct investment increases with the size of the capital inﬂow.  (k)
appears in the return on direct investment but not in the return on bank
credit, because corruption represents a greater risk to direct investment
than to bank loans. This is so both because bank lending enjoys better
protection than direct investment under the current international financial
system and because direct investment involves greater sunk costs and is
more vulnerable to ex post expropriation by corrupt government ofﬁcials.
Two points are worth noting. First, the model assumes that it is the
government that obtains and later repays bank credit. In reality, of course,
both the private and the public sector can borrow from the international
credit market. Many researchers have observed, however, that the distinc-
tion between private and public borrowing in international markets is
blurred, because private borrowing often carries an implicit, and some-
times explicit, guarantee from the borrower’s government. Second,
although direct investment is supposed to be for the long term, investors
will eventually want to recoup both the initial investment and the cumula-
tive proﬁts earned along the way.
The government’s maximization problem yields the following two ﬁrst-
order conditions:
and
This implies a particular relationship between the composition of capi-
tal inﬂow for country k and its corruption level:
( ) [( , ) ] – [( ,) ] [* () ()() ] . 91 2 2 2 0 ′′++ = UG k UG k R B k k D k δθ ρ
( ) [( , ) ] – [( ,) ] [* () ] 81 2 2 0 ′′+= UG k UG k R B k δθ
( ) [ ( )] * ( ) ( ) ( ). 7 RDk R Dk kDk =+ + θρ
( ) [ ( )] * ( ) 6 RBk R Bk =+ θ
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Hence, the higher the level of corruption in country k, the less FDI it
will receive relative to its bank borrowing. This will be the basis of the
subsequent empirical examination.
Ratio of Bank Loans to FDI
Asking whether corruption affects the composition of capital inflows
is equivalent to asking whether corruption affects FDI and international
bank loans differently. I start by examining the relationship between cor-
ruption and bilateral bank lending, in a manner analogous to the earlier
section on bilateral FDI (except that government policies toward FDI and
the tax rate on ﬁrms with foreign participation are omitted).
35
Table 9 reports four regressions with different specifications (source-
country fixed effects with or without host-country random effects). The
results are basically consistent across speciﬁcations and data sources—and
somewhat surprising. When corruption is measured by the GCR/WDR
index, it has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. In other
words, in contrast with the previous results on FDI, corruption in borrow-
ing countries seems to be associated with a higher level of borrowing from
international banks. When corruption is measured by the Transparency
International index (results not shown), it still has a positive coefficient,
but the estimate is not statistically different from zero at the 10 percent
level.
Putting the results on FDI and bank loans together, it would seem nat-
ural to expect that corruption would raise the ratio of bank loans to FDI. To
verify that this is the case, one can also check directly the connection
between the ratio of bank loans to FDI and host-country corruption. We
perform a ﬁxed-effects regression of the following sort:




11 loan source-country fixed effects
corruption)
jk jk





() ( ) / ( )[ ( ) ] / . 10 Bk Dk k =+ θρ θ
35. I have not found a consistent data source on government policies toward international
bank borrowing across countries, nor have I been able to construct such a series from the
PwC country reports.
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where   is a vector of variables other than corruption that may affect either
FDI or loans.
The results are reported in table 10, regression equations 10-1 and 10-2.
As expected, the coefﬁcient on corruption is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level in both regressions. Hence, a corrupt country
tends to have a composition of capital inﬂows that is relatively light in FDI
and relatively heavy in bank loans. Also, because FDI is more relationship-
intensive (as proxied by physical proximity and linguistic ties) than bank
loans, the coefficients on the geographic distance and the linguistic tie
variables are positive and negative, respectively, in these regressions.
An array of robustness checks was also performed employing two alter-
native measures of corruption (the Transparency International index and
the German exporters’corruption ratings; results not reported) and an
Table 9. Explaining Investment Lending with Corruption and Other Factors
a
Fixed-effects model Random-effects model
b
Independent variable 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4
Corruption 0.263** 0.215** 0.272** 0.213**
(0.064) (0.062) (0.084) (0.084)
Log GDP 1.004** 0.971** 1.054** 1.003**
(0.054) (0.052) (0.068) (0.068)
Log GDP per capita 0.366** 0.341** 0.356** 0.328**
(0.063) (0.059) (0.081) (0.079)
Log distance –0.244** –0.385** –0.428** –0.554**
(0.072) (0.075) (0.082) (0.085)
Presence of linguistic tie 0.633** 0.650** 0.818** 0.817**
(0.207) (0.195) (0.198) (0.188)
Exchange rate volatility –5.917** 2.420 –7.253** 2.850
(1.564) (1.885) (1.966) (2.551)
Government deﬁcit –0.075** –0.088**
(0.020) (0.027)
Ease of investing in equity  0.219** 0.095 0.262** 0.103
and bond markets (0.088) (0.088) (0.115) (0.119)
Summary statistics
Adjusted R
2 0.72 0.75 0.73
c 0.76
c
No. of observations 396 377 396 377
a. The dependent variable is the logarithm of bilateral bank lending flows between source and host country (averaged over
1994–96). See table 4 and appendix A for a description of the other variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes sig-
niﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. The random effects are discussed in the text.
c. Random-effects regressions report an unadjusted R
2, as the adjusted measure is not meaningful.
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alternative speciﬁcation (random rather than ﬁxed effects; regression equa-
tions 10-3 and 10-4 of table 10). The results are qualitatively similar. In
particular, the coefficient estimate on the corruption variable in every
regression is positive and statistically significant. Hence, the evidence is
overwhelming and robust that corrupt countries tend to have a structure
of capital inﬂows characterized by a relatively small share of FDI.
Instrumental Variables Regressions
One might be concerned about the possible endogeneity of the corrup-
tion measure. For example, survey respondents may perceive a country to
Table 10. Explaining the Composition of Capital Inﬂows 
with Corruption and Other Factorsa
Fixed-effects model Random-effects modelb
Independent variable 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4
Corruption 0.410** 0.455** 0.381** 0.475**
(0.093) (0.093) (0.176) (0.165)
Corporate tax rate 0.021 0.022
(0.017) (0.032)
FDI incentives 0.187 0.240
(0.153) (0.262)
FDI restrictions 0.448** 0.453**
(0.086) (0.158)
Log GDP –0.342** –0.606** –0.392** –0.695**
(0.094) (0.108) (0.157) (0.189)
Log GDP per capita –0.025 0.158 –0.019 0.193
(0.098) (0.098) (0.184) (0.182)
Log distance 0.342** 0.350** 0.547** 0.544**
(0.109) (0.094) (0.123) (0.115)
Presence of linguistic tie –0.707** –0.706** –0.686** –0.682**
(0.328) (0.307) (0.294) (0.288)
Exchange rate volatility 1.742 –0.260 2.909 0.269
(2.245) (2.058) (4.300) (3.511)
Government deﬁcit 0.028 0.038
(0.030) (0.057)
Summary statistics
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.48 0.43c 0.51c
No. of observations 238 225 238 225
a. The dependent variable is the log ratio of bank lending to FDI flows, both averaged over 1994–96. See table 4 and appen-
dix A for a description of the other variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. The random effects are discussed in the text.
c. Random-effects regressions report an unadjusted R
2, as the adjusted measure is not meaningful.
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case the negative association between the loans-to-FDI ratio and corrup-
tion could be due to reverse causality. This is of particular concern here,
because our reliable measures of corruption were derived in 1996 or later,
whereas the most recent FDI and loan data (on a bilateral basis) are from
1996 or earlier.
To address this problem, instrumental variable (IV) regressions were
performed on the key specifications. Paolo Mauro has argued that ethno-
linguistic fragmentation is a good instrument for corruption.
36 His ethno-
linguistic indicator measures the probability that two persons in a given
country are from two distinct ethnic groups. The higher the indicator, the
more fragmented the country. In addition, Rafael La Porta and his co-
authors have argued that the origin of a country’s legal system or its colo-
nial history can have an important impact on the quality of government
bureaucracy.
37 Table 11 reports a regression of the GCR/WDR corruption
measure on a constant, a measure of ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and a
set of dummies indicating the origin of the country’s legal system or colo-
nial history. Ethnically more fragmented countries are found to be more
corrupt, and countries with a common-law legal tradition (including for-
mer British colonies) are found to be less corrupt than countries with a
civil-law tradition (including former French, Spanish, and Portuguese
colonies) or countries with German or socialist legal systems.
Table 12 reports the results of the IV regressions using ethnolinguistic
fragmentation and legal origins as instruments for corruption. A standard
test for overidentiﬁed restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments and the error term are not correlated (the p values of the test
for the two regressions are 0.44 and 0.63, respectively). Thus the chosen
variables are valid instruments in a statistical sense, and we see that the
results are still consistent with the notion that corruption deters FDI more
than bank loans. This indicates that countries that are more corrupt tend
to have a capital inflow structure that relies relatively more on bank bor-
rowing and relatively less on FDI.
Shang-Jin Wei 335
36. Mauro (1995).
37. La Porta and others (1998).
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FDI incentives 0.110 0.095
(0.156) (0.157)
FDI restrictions 0.336** 0.333**
(0.093) (0.093)
Log GDP –0.274** –0.255**
(0.115) (0.118)
Log GDP per capita 0.035 0.033
(0.103) (0.102)
Log distance 0.123 0.111
(0.132) (0.132)
Presence of linguistic tie –0.752** –0.802**
(0.289) (0.295)
Exchange rate volatility –1.776
(2.223)
Summary statistics




No. of observations 180 180
a. The dependent variable is the log ratio of bank lending to FDI flows, both averaged over 1994–96. See table 4 and appen-
dix A for a description of the other variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level.
b. Corruption is instrumented by ethnolinguistic fragmentation and origin of the legal system.
c. The null hypothesis for the test of overidentiﬁed restrictions is that E(residual   instruments) = 0.
Table 11. Corruption Explained by Ethnolinguistic Fragmentation and Type of
Legal Systema
Independent variable Regression coefﬁcient
Ethnolinguistic fragmentationb 0.029**
(0.002)
Legal system of French origin 1.907**
(0.157)
Legal system of German origin 2.725**
(0.326)




No. of observations 180
a. The dependent variable is the GCR/WDR corruption index. Countries of British legal origin are the benchmark in the regres-
sion. Those of Scandinavian legal origin are omitted because of lack of observations. Standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
b. The probability that two persons in a given country are from two distinct ethnic groups.
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Portfolio and Direct Investment from the United States
Although bilateral data on portfolio investment other than bank credit
are not available for the whole set of capital-exporting countries exam-
ined above, data on portfolio investment from the United States to a set
of developing countries are available. These data can be used to examine
whether the ratio of portfolio to direct investment in a capital-receiving
country is affected by its level of corruption. Note that because the number
of observations is small (between thirty-five and thirty-nine, depending
on the regression speciﬁcation), the power of the statistical tests is likely to
be low. 
Table 13 reports the results of ﬁxed-effects regressions that examine the
relationship between the ratio of portfolio investment to FDI and corrup-
tion. All three equations use the GCR/WDR indicator of corruption. At
least for this subsample of countries, the ratio of portfolio investment to
FDI is again positively related to the capital-importing country’s level of
corruption: the more corrupt a country is, the less FDI it tends to receive
relative to portfolio capital. However, in other regressions using the Trans-
parency International corruption index (results not shown), the coefﬁcients
on corruption are no longer statistically significant, although they are
always positive. Their failure to reach signiﬁcance is consistent with a gen-
uinely zero coefficient but may also result from the low power of the sta-
tistical test due to the small sample size.
Conclusion
These analyses indicate that corruption in capital-importing countries
affects both the volume and the composition of their capital inflows. In
particular, corruption reduces inward foreign direct investment substan-
tially. Previous studies of this issue did not take proper account of gov-
ernments’policies toward FDI. The comprehensive measures reported in
this paper of host governments’restrictions on FDI and the incentives
they offer to attract FDI are a contribution toward repairing that omis-
sion. When these policies are controlled for, corruption in the host coun-
try continues to exhibit a negative, statistically significant, and quantita-
tively large effect on inward FDI.
Although corrupt countries thus receive less FDI than do less corrupt
countries, they may not face an equivalent disadvantage in obtaining bank
9760-09  BPEA Wei  12/21/2000 14:20  Page 337338 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
loans. As a result, corruption in a capital-importing country may tend to
distort the composition of its capital inflows away from FDI and toward
foreign bank loans. The analyses reported in this paper support this
hypothesis. Furthermore, the observed effect of corruption on the ratio of
borrowing from foreign banks to inward FDI is robust across different
measures of corruption and different econometric speciﬁcations. There are
two possible reasons for this effect. First, FDI is more likely ex post to suf-
fer interference from corrupt local officials than are foreign loans. As a
result, less FDI is likely to go to corrupt countries ex ante. Second, the cur-
rent international ﬁnancial architecture provides more insurance and other
Table 13. Explaining the Composition of Capital Flows Using 
Outward U.S. Portfolio Investment Dataa
Regression equation
Independent variable 13-1 13-2 13-3
Corruption 0.224* 0.223* 0.239#
(0.121) (0.120) (0.145)






Log GDP 0.304** 0.311** 0.371**
(0.138) (0.152) (0.161)
Log GDP per capita 0.506** 0.517** 0.441**
(0.100) (0.100) (0.152)
Log distance –0.200* –0.187# –0.194#
(0.101) (0.113) (0.129)
Presence of linguistic tie 0.870** 0.814** 1.004**
(0.238) (0.251) (0.287)
Exchange rate volatility 3.515** 3.990#
(1.649) (2.367)
Government deﬁcit 0.009 0.023
(0.034) (0.047)
Ease in investing in equity 0.364*
and bond markets  (0.203)
Summary statistics
Adjusted R2  0.52 0.56 0.60
No. of observations 39 36 35
a. The dependent variable is the log ratio of U.S. portfolio investment to U.S. FDI summed over 1994–96, for a sample of devel-
oping countries. See table 4 and appendix A for a description of the other variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level, and # at the 15 percent level.
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protection from the International Monetary Fund and the Group of Seven
for bank lenders than for direct investors.
Previous research has shown that a capital inﬂow structure that is rela-
tively low in FDI is associated with a greater propensity for a future cur-
rency crisis. It may be that international bank loans (or other portfolio
flows) swing more than direct investment in the event of bad news
(whether the “news” is of real events or generated by the investors them-
selves) about economic or policy fundamentals. If this is the case, 
this paper has provided evidence for one possible channel through which
corruption in a developing country may increase its chances of suffering
a crisis.
In the literature on the causes of currency crises, crony capitalism and
self-fulfilling expectations on the part of international creditors are often
proposed as two rival hypotheses. Indeed, authors who subscribe to one
view often reject the other. The evidence in this paper, however, suggests a
natural link between the two. Crony capitalism, through its effect on the
composition of a country’s capital inflows, may make the country more
vulnerable to a currency crisis spawned by self-fulﬁlling expectations.
APPENDIX A
Data Sources and Construction of the Variables
Data series Source and description
Bilateral bank lending Bank for International Settlements. Data are total loans
outstanding, in millions of dollars, as of the end of December.
Loans to offshore banking centers are omitted.
Bilateral foreign direct  OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 
investment ﬂows 1998. Data are in millions of dollars, converted using yearly
average exchange rates from annex III of the publication.
Distance Great Circle distance, in kilometers, between the economic
centers (usually the capital cities) of country pairs. Distances
are based on latitude and longitude data from Rudloff (1981),
updated from information in Pearce and Smith (1984).
(continued)
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Data series Source and description
Linguistic tie Major languages for each country are taken from the CIA World
Factbook (www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/). The
variable equals one if the source and the host country share a
common language or one country is a former colony of the
other. Additional languages are assigned for some countries
besides the ofﬁcial languages.
GCR corruption  Global Competitiveness Report 1997 (World Econimic Forum
index and Harvard Institute for International Development, 1997).  
Values of the index used in this paper are calculated as 8
minus the original value.
WDR corruption  World Bank, World Development Report 1997 (World Bank, 
index 1997). Values of the index used in this paper are calculated as
8 minus the original value.
German exporters’ Data were “assembled by Peter Neumann (1994) and his 
corruption index collaborators at Impulse, a German business publication.
Neumann’s strategy consisted in interviewing people with
business experience in each of the countries included in the
study, especially concentrating on German exporters who
normally had business in the countries concerned. On average,
10 individuals were interviewed per country (the minimum
number was 3) with a guarantee of conﬁdentiality on their
identities. This index (CORRGEX) indicates the proportion of
the total number of deals that involved corrupt payments.”
(p. 1031) The data were ﬁrst used in Ades and Di Tella (1997),
from which the above description is quoted, and were kindly
made available to the author by Rafael Di Tella.
Transparency  Transparency International (www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/icr.htm) 
International index  1998 index. Values of the index in this paper are calculated as
10 minus the original value.
GDP World Bank SIMA/GDF and WDI central database. GDP data
are at market prices in constant 1995 dollars.
GDP per capita GDP data from the above source divided by country
population.
Exchange rate  Exchange rate data are from International Monetary Fund, 
volatility International Financial Statistics, via the World Bank SIMA
database. 
Government deﬁcit World Bank SIMA/GDF and WDI central database. Data are
expressed as a percentage of GDP.
U.S. bilateral portfolio  U.S. Treasury Department (www.ustreas.gov/tic/ticsec.shtml). 
investment ﬂows Data for each country are the sum of U.S. portfolio investment
in the country (gross sales by foreigners of foreign bonds and
foreign stocks to U.S. residents) from 1994 to 1996, in
millions of dollars.
Legal system origin La Porta and others (1998).
(continued)
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Data series Source and description
Accounting standards La Porta and others (1998). The index was “created by
examining and rating companies’1990 annual reports on their
inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into
seven categories (general information, income statements,
balance sheets, funds ﬂow statement, accounting standards,
stock data and special items). A minimum of three companies
in each country were studied. The companies represent a
cross-section of various industry groups; industrial companies
represent 70 percent and ﬁnancial companies represented the
remaining 30 percent” (p. 1125).
Corporate tax rate PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), updating GCR (1997).
APPENDIX B
Corruption Indexes, Corporate Tax Rates, 
and GDP per Capita by Country
Corruption index
Corporate GDP
Transparency German tax rate per capita
a




Argentina 4.5 7.0 6 30 7,767
Armenia 4.5 6 766
Australia 2.0 1.3 0 33 18,795
Austria 1.8 2.5 0 34 26,838
Azerbaijan 5.5 6 492
Bangladesh 10 314
Belarus 5.0 6.1 4 1,875
Belgium and  2.5 4.4 0 40 10,365
Luxembourg
Benin 5.0 368
Bolivia 4.2 7.2 8 905
Botswana 3.9 3,179
Brazil 4.2 6.0 8 41 4,107
Bulgaria 5.5 7.1 4 36 1,394
Cameroon 5.2 8.6 6 608
Canada 1.7 0.8 0 38 18,027
Chad 4.8 217
(continued)
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Corruption index
Corporate GDP
Transparency German tax rate per capita
a
Country GCR/WDR International exporters’ (percent) (1995 dollars)
Chile 2.3 3.2 2 35 3,868
China 4.1 6.5 8 30 543
Colombia 5.1 7.8 8 30 1,928
Congo, 8 144
Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of 5.2 6 832
Costa Rica 4.3 4.4 4 30 2,479
Côte d’Ivoire 4.9 6.9 6 735
Czech Rep. 3.3 5.2 4 35 4,569
Denmark 1.6 0.0 0 34 32,332
Dominican Rep. 4 1,538
Ecuador 4.6 7.7 4 1,564
Egypt, 2.0 7.1 8 42 950
Arab Rep. of
El Salvador 4.5 6.4 1,652
Estonia 2.6 4.3 2 3,229
Ethiopia 4 104
Fiji 2.9 2,477
Finland 1.3 0.4 0 28 22,899
France 2.6 3.3 0 33.3 24,602
Gabon 6 4,473
Georgia 5.0 4 574
Germany 2.0 2.1 0 42 27,549
Ghana 4.3 6.7 6 379
Greece 5.0 5.1 6 40 10,272
Guatemala 5.4 6.9 1,460
Guinea 5.2 558
Guinea-Bissau 3.7 234
Honduras 5.4 8.3 701
Hong Kong 1.8 2.2 0 16.5 21,167
Hungary 3.9 5.0 6 18 4,075
Iceland 4.3 0.7 33 24,656
India 5.1 7.1 8 40 365
Indonesia 5.5 8.0 10 30 973
Iran, Islamic  10 1,416
Rep. of
Ireland 1.9 1.8 0 32 16,643
Israel 2.7 2.9 2 36 14,475
Italy 4.1 5.4 6 37 17,617
Jamaica 3.1 6.2 1,648
Japan 2.2 4.2 0 37.5 38,514
Jordan 4.5 5.3 4 1,548
Kazakhstan 5.1 4 1,277
(continued)
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Corruption index
Corporate GDP
Transparency German tax rate per capita
a
Country GCR/WDR International exporters’ (percent) (1995 dollars)
Kenya 4.3 7.5 6 333
Korea, Rep. of 4.3 5.8 6 28 9,428
Kuwait 6 15,987
Kyrgyz Rep. 4.9 4 767
Latvia 4.6 7.3 4 2,516
Lithuania 3.9 0 1,863
Madagascar 5.0 238
Malawi 3.1 5.9 149
Malaysia 4.0 4.7 4 28 3,951
Mali 4.4 252
Mauritius 3.5 5.0 3,543
Mexico 4.4 6.7 6 34 3,047
Moldova 5.0 698
Morocco 4.6 6.3 4 36 1,242
Mozambique 4.4 124
Namibia 4.7 2 2,159
Netherlands 1.8 1.0 0 35 24,104
New Zealand 1.8 0.6 0 38 15,488
Nicaragua 5.5 7.0 454
Nigeria 3.8 8.1 10 256
Norway 1.4 1.0 0 28 31,579
Pakistan 7.3 10 500
Paraguay 4.5 8.5 8 1,839
Peru 3.4 5.5 6 30 2,471
Philippines 5.5 6.7 10 35 989
Poland 4.6 5.4 4 32 2,870
Portugal 2.7 3.5 0 36 9,865
Romania 7.0 6 1,340
Russia 5.3 7.6 8 35 2,198
Saudi Arabia 8 6,227
Senegal 4.4 6.7 8 541
Sierra Leone 6 202
Singapore 1.6 0.9 0 26 26,502
Slovak Rep. 3.6 6.1 4 40 3,043
Slovenia 2 8,770
South Africa 3.4 4.8 0 35 3,189
Spain 2.8 3.9 6 35 13,307
Sweden 1.4 0.5 0 28 24,281
Switzerland 1.8 1.1 0 23 40,708
Syrian Arab Rep. 6 1,156
Taiwan 3.3 5.3 6 25 11,452
Tajikistan 4 297
Tanzania 5.0 8.1 6 168
(continued)
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Corruption index
Corporate GDP
Transparency German tax rate per capita
a
Country GCR/WDR International exporters’ (percent) (1995 dollars)
Thailand 5.5 7.0 10 30 2,620
Togo 4.2 321
Tunisia 5.0 4 2,042
Turkey 4.2 6.6 4 33 2,606
Turkmenistan 4 980
Uganda 4.4 7.4 6 299
Ukraine 4.3 7.2 4 30 1,575
United Arab 8 0 17,147
Emirates
United Kingdom 1.5 1.3 0 30 17,615
United States 1.9 2.5 0 35 25,078
Uruguay 5.7 4 5,739
Uzbekistan 5.2 4 990
Venezuela 5.2 7.7 8 34 3,260
Vietnam 5.3 7.5 33 274
Zambia 3.3 6.5 8 401
Zimbabwe 3.9 5.8 6 37.5 665
Source: See appendix A.
a. Average for 1994–96.
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APPENDIX C
Robustness Checks
Table C1. Explaining Foreign Direct Investment Adding 
Host-Country Random Effectsa
Regression equation
Independent variable C1-1 C1-2 C1-3 C1-4b
Corruption –0.338** –0.289** –0.180* –0.205**
(0.109) (0.113) (0.104) (0.073)
Corporate tax rate –0.035* –0.039** –0.002 –0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
FDI incentives 0.371** 0.259 0.275**
(0.154) (0.158) (0.111)
FDI restrictions –0.340** –0.278** –0.294**
(0.095) (0.088) (0.060)
Log GDP 0.977** 0.960** 1.114** 1.040**
(0.079) (0.088) (0.083) (0.057)
Log GDP per capita –0.113 –0.106 –0.009 0.026
(0.126) (0.141) (0.124) (0.085)
Log distance –0.873** –0.844** –0.865** –0.656**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.071) (0.067)
Presence of linguistic tie 1.098** 1.064** 1.028** 1.232**
(0.195) (0.195) (0.204) (0.214)
Exchange rate volatility 0.928 2.388
(2.971) (2.110)
Government deﬁcit –0.116** –0.096**
(0.024) (0.016)
Summary statistics
R2 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76
No. of observations 658 628 580 580
a. The dependant variable is the logarithm of annual bilateral flows of FDI between source and host countries (averaged over
1994–96). The random effects are discussed in the text.  Other independent variables are deﬁned as in table 4 and appendix A. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
b. Reprints regression equation 4-3 in table 4.
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Comment and 
Discussion
Andrei Shleifer: Shang-Jin Wei’s paper is an important addition to the
growing literature on the relationship between institutions and economic
outcomes. By and large, this literature shows that poor public sector insti-
tutions have great power in explaining poor economic outcomes from slow
growth, to low investment (both domestic and foreign), to low educa-
tional attainment, to high infant mortality. As Wei also points out, poor
institutions of law and corporate governance are increasingly seen as
responsible—perhaps far more responsible than poor macroeconomic con-
ditions or even macroeconomic policies—for the depth of the recent Asian
ﬁnancial crisis. The crucial paper in this area is that by Simon Johnson and
his coauthors.
1 These authors examine the depth of the crisis as measured
by currency depreciations and stock market declines across emerging mar-
ket economies. Like others, they find that macroeconomic variables,
whether measures of precrisis conditions or of crisis policies, have only
limited power in explaining the variation in the depth of the crisis across
countries. In contrast, simple measures of law and order and the extent of
protection of shareholders have a great deal of explanatory power. Thus
economies with the best institutions, such as Singapore and Hong Kong,
experienced the mildest crises, whereas those with the weakest institu-
tions, such as the Philippines and Russia, suffered the deepest.
The paper by Johnson and his colleagues has another message rele-
vant to understanding Wei’s results, namely, that it is difficult to say pre-
cisely which of a number of poor institutions are responsible for the depth
of the crisis. The point can be made more generally. Various measures of
1. Johnson and others (2000).
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institutional quality, even when they come from different sources, and
even when they address conceptually distinct aspects of the quality of
government, are strongly positively correlated with each other. One paper
in which this point comes out clearly is that by Rafael La Porta and oth-
ers.
2 These authors show strong positive correlations among such indexes
of the quality of government as those measuring property rights protec-
tion, the quality of regulation, corruption, bureaucratic delay, and tax
compliance. Moreover, when predicting various social outcomes, such
as school attainment or infant mortality, nearly all of these variables have
some predictive power, and it is impossible to tell which one makes the
crucial difference. Nor does an instrumental variables procedure solve
this problem, since the same potential instruments, such as ethnolinguis-
tic heterogeneity, geography, and origin of the legal system, have the
power to forecast nearly all aspects of institutional quality.
This problem is very important in interpreting Wei’s results. His is a
paper about corruption and its adverse effects, although he recognizes
that corruption may reﬂect low institutional quality more broadly. I would
indeed conjecture that other measures of institutional quality would also
have signiﬁcant predictive power in his regressions. One can thus interpret
his evidence as suggesting that poor institutional quality is associated with
low levels of foreign capital ﬂows, including foreign direct investment, but
not necessarily that corruption is the key feature of this poor institutional
quality.
The fact that, empirically, it is difﬁcult to tell which aspect of the qual-
ity of government is “causing” poor outcomes is important for a number of
reasons. Start with corruption. If we think that corruption itself is respon-
sible for poor outcomes, then strategies to reduce corruption, such as the
introduction of checks and balances in the government, better selection
procedures for bureaucrats, and so on, become very attractive policies.
But, of course, corruption is endogenous. Countries that have high lev-
els of corruption generally have interventionist and abusively regulating
governments. As Samuel Huntington pointed out long ago, corruption
might actually be a Pareto-improving response to abusive government
policies.
3 In fact, there is some empirical support for the view that cor-
ruption is strongly associated with bad regulation. Simeon Djankov and
2. La Porta and others (1999).
3. Huntington (1968).
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others examined, in a sample of seventy-five countries, policies govern-
ing the regulation of entry by new firms.
4 They found that countries with
more regulation of entry, in terms of the number of required permits and
licenses, also have more corruption, even when the level of economic
development is controlled for. If one takes the view that corruption is just
a way around abusive regulation, the policy prescriptions become very dif-
ferent. Rather than aim at corruption, policy reform should focus on reduc-
ing regulation, and more generally on reducing government intervention in
the economy.
Of course, as I have already indicated, Wei’s results may have ab-
solutely nothing to do with corruption, but rather have to do with some
other aspect of low institutional quality, such as poor security of property
rights or poor quality of the judiciary. Because of the high correlation
among these variables, the coefficients on corruption in his regressions
might be proxying for these inﬂuences as well. The trouble is that, if this is
the case, the policy prescriptions again change dramatically, depending
on which aspect of institutional quality is doing the damage. If the qual-
ity of the judiciary is to blame, then good policies might include selecting
and training better judges, simplifying and speeding up judicial proce-
dures, and creating specialized courts, including courts for foreign
investors. If poor security of property rights is at issue, the focus should be
on the institutions protecting these rights, including courts but also includ-
ing various regulatory agencies. None of this means that Wei’s ﬁndings are
invalid, but rather that it is necessary to take the next step in understanding
the relationship between poor institutions and outcomes in order to decide
what to do.
Unfortunately, in this area research is only beginning, and no straight-
forward conclusion has emerged. In some areas, such as the development
of securities markets, it is becoming increasingly clear that some form of
public regulation—particularly in the areas of disclosure and protection
against expropriation—is needed for markets to develop.
5 Market mecha-
nisms in this area do not appear to be powerful enough to sustain market
development without some institutional protection. In other areas, such
as the regulation of entry by new entrepreneurs, wise institutional reform
4. Djankov and others (2000).
5. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2000).
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tion, particularly in developing countries.
6 Perhaps the clearest lesson
that emerges from the data is that, as countries develop and become more
democratic, many—in fact, nearly all—institutions improve, and this of
course has further salutary effects on development. We are learning more
and more about these issues, and Wei’s paper is another very useful step
in our expanding knowledge in this area.
General discussion: Edward Glaeser observed that examining the extent
to which foreign direct investment is affected differently from domestic
investment could help identify whether Wei’s results truly reflected cor-
ruption or were picking up effects, such as excessive regulation, that cor-
related with corruption, as Andrei Shleifer had suggested. Clear regula-
tions on business might be expected to affect both foreign and domestic
investment the same, whereas corruption could affect them differently,
since getting things done then requires local knowledge of whom to bribe
and so forth. If corruption, rather than other characteristics that correlate
with it, is driving the results, linguistic similarities and physical proxim-
ity might be expected to reduce its effects, although perhaps not in the case
of large projects, where it would be worth finding a way to acquire those
advantages.
Hélène Rey suggested looking at the motivation of FDI, recognizing
that some such investment is undertaken to take advantage of low labor
costs and some to access a large domestic market. Variables such as GDP
and the square of population address these motivations indirectly, but
adding a labor cost variable could sharpen the results. If some elements
of the corruption measure were associated with trade barriers, their impact
might differ according to the motivation. Thus, differentiating FDI by the
motive for it might help identify which features of the corruption variable
are most important.
Several participants discussed the problem of identifying the impact of
Wei’s corruption variable and the problem of choosing instrumental vari-
ables. William Dickens noted that the instrumental variables Wei used are
not adequate, because even if they are exogenous, they are as likely to be
correlated with institutions other than corruption, leaving the problem
350 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
6. Djankov and others (2000).
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which regimes have changed, presumably leaving institutions in place but
creating new corruption, for evidence on the effects of corruption on FDI.
However, Glaeser questioned whether one could rely on such a pattern of
stable institutions and rising corruption following regime changes. Robert
Hall reported that, out of the extensive work that has been done on choos-
ing instruments, the best choice for this type of analysis seemed to be lat-
itude, or mortality in early settlements, which correlates closely with
latitude.
Matthew Shapiro observed that the paper took a supply-side approach
to corruption by focusing on the pattern of corruption presented by host
countries. He suggested also looking at the demand side, that is, how
source-country FDI varies according to corruption in the hosts. Source
countries have different customs and laws concerning the accommoda-
tion of corruption abroad. Differences in source-country laws—both
across countries and across time—might provide instrumental variables
that can address the endogeneity problem.
In this connection, Shleifer cited work by James Hines showing that
after the mid-1970s, when the law was passed that penalizes U.S. ﬁrms for
bribing foreign governments, U.S. firms suffered problems in markets
where they compete with other foreign investors. Wei noted that his results
included a variable to account for this U.S. inhibition, but he added that,
over his data period, no other country applied such sanctions.
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